The current inflation: the United States experience by Albert E. Burger
‘FT ME begin by setting forth a position on the
features of the “new inflation.” First, the current wide-
spread inflation across industrial coumitries is a “new”
inflatiomi only in the sense tiat it is a phemiomimenon of
the last ten years. The current inflation hmas not been
largely determined by the. supply behavior of non-
imidustrial countries. The basic cause of the current
inflatiomi is the sanme as the cause of au previous infla—
tions — too much money chasing too few goods.
The most disturhlimmg aspect of the current imiflation
is not timat timere imas been a moy-emeut from one rate
of price imicrease te a mmew maintained hiigher level of
price increase, bnt that there has beemi a periodic
upward mnoveumem’mt in the rate t
1
f inflation. There is
mio reasomm that timis process has to eoutmmmue. Policy—
mnakers have time pouver to prevent a permammenty
accelerating rate uf price immerease. It is true that more
attention is being devoted to “how to hive with infia-
tiomi” rather thami “how to fight inflation,” bmmt this is
a very dammgerorms approaeim. A little inflation heads to a
Note: The views expressed i’m this article are the respommsi-
Imility of tIme autlmom’ and do miot necessarily reflect the views
or the Federal Reserve Systenm,
little more immfiatiomm which leads toa little mnore imifla-
tiomi umitih irmflatiomi has heconie a mnajor disruptive
fasce imi time eeomrmommmie as well as the social fabric of
a country.
Arm exogemmorms decrease iii time srmpphy of omme good
will te.nd to (1) raise time price of that good. (2.) raise
the demrmmmmid for and prmee of substitrmte goods, ( 3)
h.ower tIme de.nmmand for eomnphemnemmtary goods md. hemmee
put dowmmward pressrmres om:m time prices of these goods)
Time way a mmmarke.t eeommomny’ adirmsts to a change in
supply commditiomms is through eimammges in relative prices
amid re-ahhocatiomm of resources frommm omme type of pro-
duction to amiothier. Assumning rio Govermmnmemit controls
mticom.m,.,m,.mmsts refer to two goeds as smmhstitrmtes if both goods
have mmmamsv mmrcmpertie.s that satisfy time sarmme preferences of
eonsummmers; for example, gas mmeat ammO electric heat, prmlmc
trammsmmortatmon armd autommmohmlem, a vacation ins hmmrope and mm
vacation i’m the Ummited States, Goods that a me tmsed trmgetlme
are called complemmmemmtan’ goods; for exammmpie. gmtsohimme ammd
autonmobmies, tires amid am.itommmmohiles, Europeamm vacatiomms amid
airline travel.
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on prices, resources will be bid away from those in-
dustries producing complementary goods and will
mmmove immto indrmstries prodrmeimmg srmblstitute goods. 1mm—
itiahly, tie average price level will rise, assuming
prices of complementary goods are not immediately
flexible downward, and nmmenmployment will tempo-
rarily rise since resources do not immediately move
fully from producing eonmplementary goods to pro-
clueing substitute goods.
For a decrease imi time supply of omme good to cause
a pernmanemmt imicrease in immfiatiomi, Imolding growth of
total expenditures eommst;tmmt, wouhh appear to require
thmat the iteni was so vital to production thiat rmo sub-
stitute existed or eouid he developed In that case,
reducing time supply of tmat good nmeans that the
potential growth of real outpmit is reduced. Tins seems
a itghly unlikely case, except in time short-run. Man
seems capable of finding a substitute good for almost
any item. However, even if this were the case, the
immcrease in inflation is miot nltinmatehy drme to the redue-
tiomi imm supply, bunt results fronm tlme fact that growth
of total expendittires is not reduced alomig with the
reduced growth of real output. If the growth of total
expendittmres is nmaintained, but time growth of real
output is redtmced, themm prices will rise more rapidly.
Time monetary autimorities cannot affect the suppiy
situation, but tmey can follow policies that reduce the
growtm of total expenditures.
Inflation began to develop in time United States hong
before any so-called supply-immduced effects developed.
For example, over the 1963-69 period real output rose
at an average annuah rate of 4.7 percent. comnpared to
an average rate of about 3 percent over the previous
ten years. However, from 1.963 to 1969 time rate of
inflation increased to a 3 percent annual rate, about
double the rate of the previous ten years.2
We must hook somnewhere other timan at supply fac-
tors for the underlying cause of inflatiomm. Time basic
underlying cause of time irmfhation cnrrentlv beimmg cx-
periemmced in time United States is simply that time trend
growth of mommey hmas lleen ;mceeherating over time last
ten years, approaclmimmg a 7 percemmt rate on average
rIver time ia5t three yemrrs. Thmis imas rc’sultecl imm a
growths of chemmmammd for goods and services timat is mmmmmclm
greater titan tIme lommg-termmm average growtim of real
output.
I i%’J’F’NTh’ (..F xmj)m’~’’r ~
Thme curremmt immtent of mnonetary policy in time Ummited
States is to reduce immfhatiomm ammcl avoid causing a sub—
stammtiah nmedirmmmm-ternm rise mm unemiiploymemmt. Imm fact
this is time same “intent” timat hias characterized nione-
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tary policy since the middle 1966s. No member of the
Federal Open Market Committee desired to have the
rate of inflation, as measured by the consunmer price
index, rise fromn an average annual rate of about 1.5
percent over the period 1952-64 to an average annual
rate of about 4 percent from 1964 timrough 1972, or to
see price increases accelerate to an average annual
rate of over 6 percemit during 1973, as shown in Clmart
I.
The basic force undenhyimmg time accelerating infla-
tion in time Ummited States has been the accelerating
average armmmuah growth of time nmommey stock. As shmowmm
ism Chart II, the growth of time nmommey stock acceler-
ated from about a 2 percent average annual rate over
the period 1952-62 to about a 5 percent annuai rate
over the period from 1962 tlmrough 1970. Over the
period 1962-70 the growtim of the money stock foh-
lowed a pattern of sharp accelerations followed by
periods of shmarp reductiomms imm the growtlm rate (for
exaniphe, in 1966 and frommm early 1969 to early 1970).
Since 1970 the growth of nmoney Imas reaccelerated
to about a 7 percent annual rate,At the same time,
real ormtput has gromvn at an average rate of ahlout 4
percent since 1962, sommmewhat faster tbman its average
annual rate of about 3 percent recorded over the pre-
\-iorms teom years. \Vitlm progressive acceleratiomms
rate of growthm of mnoney leaclimmg to a mmmarkedhy
growth of total expemmditures, ammdh withm real
growimmg at onhv a shiglmtiy- mimore rapid rate,





Again, I do mmot hlelieve thmat any mmmemnller of time
Federal Open Market Commmmittee (lesiredi time pro-
gressive upward mmmovemmmemmts imm time growtim of monte>’.
From 1964 to 1973 tIme Federal Opemm Market Coni-
mnittee (FOMC) nmet 141 tiomes ammd \‘otedh for apolicy
of restraint at seventy’ percemmt (If these mmmeetimmgs. Ommly
in 1967 amid 1970 did time FOMC adopt a policy of
ease at virtrmallv every nieetimmg.
Civemm timat time immtemst of policy has mmot chmammged,
why has thmere imeen a progressIve rise mm thme average
growthm of time mnonev stock amid, imemmce, a progressive
rise iii immflatiomm? Three relatedh factors-appear to ac—
count for thmis situatiomi. First, imm time Ummited States
since time nmici-1960s, timere hmas heemm a simarp rise in
time growth of Covermmmemmt spemmdhng. Since 1965. Fed-
eral Covermmmmmemmt expemmditmmres hmax-e risemm at amm aver-
age. ammmmrmai rate of 10 Ilercemmt, compared to abommt a
6 pereemmt rate over time pmcviOtms temi x’ears. lmm 1966
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whmich rose 20 percent per year. However, since 1967
thme growthm of defemmse spemmdimmg hmas heemm mmmuelm slower,
and actually deel~nedfrommm 1969 timrongim 1973. Time
rise in Federal Colvernmemmt expendi.tumres since 1965
Imas prinmarily reflected the public’s growing demands
thmat time Covernnment sector dl() mmmore i.mm time way of
social welfare programs. Since 1965, Federal nonde-
fense expemmditures lmav-e ris cmi at a 12.6 pereemmt mmmmmmuah
rate, commmpared to a 9.5 rate over time prev’mous ten
years.
Essemmtiahhv, time public hmas dlemmmammded thmat the Coy—
ernmemmt sector provide a larger flow of goods ammd
scm-vices. However, while Covermmnment spemmdismg was
rising, taxes were not raised ermough to finance the in-
creased expemmditures. Thmis hrings us to time secomid
factor. As a result of a risimig spread betsveemm tax
revenues and Covernmemmt expenditures, thme growth
of the outstandimmg stock of Covernnment securities ac-
celerated as the Covenmmnent was forced to borrow
to finance its expemmditures. Over time period of fiscal
year 1966 thmroughm fiscal 1973, Federal Covernnment
expenditures exceeded tax receipts by ahnmost $98 bil-
lion. Time net result of dleficit fimmammcimmg was tmpwardi
pressures on market interest rates.
‘I’hmis brimmgs mis to the thirdh factomr. Time Federal Re—
serve Systemmm traditionally has been cormcenmed withm
the stability of immterest rates ammd with time “vi.ahility”
of fimmancial markets. Commseqnenmthv. time F’edernh Re-
serve hmas temmded to resist dhemammd-determimmedl move-
memmts in immterest rates and hmas ahway-s stood ready to
offer substammtimml mudl to time financmah mmmarkets in times
of shess. Thme suhmstmmmmtiah rise in Covermmnient fimmancing
requirenments was humid to pumt upwardl pressures 0mm
market immterest rates audi put stress 0mm fimmammcial mar-
kets. Essentially, the Cov-ermmnment xva.s attemptimmg to
acquire more fo.nmds tlmamm before tlmroughm time credhit
markets, audi, assummmiug rmo cimammge in time growthm of
total credi.t, other demmmamm.diers of credht would have
lmad to be ratiommed oust of time market.
Among thme (mthmer demanders of credit was the lions-
big industry-. As nmarket y-i.elds on Covernment deilt
rose, fummds were drawn. out of savings amid hoan as-
sociatmons, the supply’ of funds to finance lmousimmg fell,
and mortgage interest rates rose. Questions arose
about the solvency of the major fimmancers of mortgage
credit. ‘l’imese results. alommg myth pressures omi the fi—
mmancimmg of state amid local gOvermmnmemmts, dleveloped
quite early’ imm time infiatiommary process, ammd in 1966
cuhnmimmated mm ivimat hmas commme td lie coiled “the credit
crmmnchm (if 1966.”
The Federal Reserve came under commsiderabhe criti-
cism for permmmittimmg time devehopmemmt of time “crummmcim”
in 1966. ilowever, ahthmough certain Federal Reserve
policies probably added to the straimm 0mm financial n’mar-
kets at that time, time sitmmation in 1966 reflectedl
the attemnpt of financial nmarkets to adjust to the added
fimmancing pressures from time Federal Coyenmnment. The
1966 Federah Reserve pohcy of resisting a substantial
expansiomm in nmomiev ammd credit was mmmi attempt to
force the adjustment through financial markets. If the
Com’ernmemmt was goimmg to get a larger shmare of real
output, then some othmer sector had to receive a smahler
share.
The Federal Reserve tried to lmaht the upward march
of inflation again in 196~, From February 1969 to
February 1970 mnonetary policy actions showed the
growth of time money stock to about a 3 percent rate.
Tlmis led to time showdowmm in econonmmc activity imm 1970,
audi from abont mmmid—1970 there was evidemmee of a
slowing in inflatiomm. By time emidi of 1970. time nmarket
yield 0mm ‘lreasur hills hmmmdl fnhhen below 5 percemmt,
comparedl to about 8 percexmt at time emmdi of 1969. In
time first (itmmmrter (If 1971, y’ieids omm hong-term corporate
bummds lmacl eased to about 7.25 pem’cent, commmpared to
about 8 percent in late 1969,
However, after early 1970, Federal Reserve actions
resulted in areacceheration imm time growth of time mommey
stock. Fronm 1970 thmrougim 1973, Federah Reserve
credht grew at amm average anmmumai rate of ftS per-
cent and time nionetamy base grew at a 7.7 percent rate.
On balance, since early 1970, money has grown at
about a 7 percent rate. Abthmough inflation continued
at a shower rate through hate 1972, ilow nmuchm of timis
was (hue to time lagged effect of thme previoumsshowimmg
of mmiommev on prices extemmding immto late 1972 is open
to diuestiomi. in August 1971 a fmmirhy comprelmensive
set (If price and wage commtrols was instituted in time
Ummitedi States. Time hag imi time respommse of prices to
time reacceleration of nmommcy probmml.i]y’ reflected the
effect of timese price commtrols. Soommer or lmmter time ump—
ward pressumre omi pm-ices hmad to surface, mmd price
controls appear to have ommlv (iehay-edl time upward
timrust of prIces. Time mmmai.n result of time. various pimases,
of price comitrols was time distortiomm imm sumpply- commdi—
tiosms thmat time Ummited States is still expericmmcimmg.
U: ~~ ~ f ~ ., :% U S:-r-( t’mvU ~..m. .m’ .m.mi.m.’i im.tit, 5:
y~m;~yr~ .poi.icy
Infiatiomm affects current monetary policy because in-
flatiomm affects immterest rates and financial markets, Also,
aeceherating inflation, whuen joimmed witim price confrohs,
tends to raise qumestiomms about time predictive perfonn—
ammee of ecouonmetric models that are used to forecast
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the response of the economy to policy actions. A fur-
ther effect has heeim the suggestion by some observers
that “real” instead of mmominal quantities should be
used as indicators of time effects of policy actions.
Recentiy the Ummited States imas been experiencing
levels of interest rates timat are “imighm” by historical
standards. However, it would be imard to ascribe these
Imigim interest rates to “tight” monetary policy. As
shown imm Cimart III, over thme last three years thme immomo-
eta.ry base has gro\vn at a 7.7 perceomt rate, compared
to about a 5 percefmt rate frommm 1962 through 1970
and hess than a 2 percent rate over time 1952-62 period.
Bammk credit immms growmm at about mm 13 percemmt rate
since 1970, conmpared to a 7.6 percent rate over time
previoums five years, amid about a 6 percemmt rate frommm
1955-65. Thmese growth rates immdicate that Federal
Reserve actiomms have resulted mm a large enougim growth
of time mommetmmry hiase to sumpport a substantially more
rapid expammsion of haimk credit thmami imm previous
periods.
Time immerease imm the monetary’ base predommnatmthy
reflected time fact that time Federal Reserve System
purchased a large vohunme of (loveromommelmt secmirities
amid thme ‘I’reasury mmmommetized time proceeds of time May
1972 ammd October 1973 chammges imm time officiah price
mmt whmichm time U.S. gold stock is valued. ‘lime mimommetary
base averaged $20 bliihiomm imigimer in 1973 thmmul imm 1970.
time Federal Reserve’s imoidings of Covermflneut secun-
ties averaged 817.8 hilhomm mnore imm 1973 thmau in 1970,
and time hreasurv,sactiosms suhiseqmmemmt to thme two of—
ficiah revaitmatiolms (If time U.S. gold stock addeo -82
hiilhiomm to time mnommetarv base,
A cemmtrah bank policy-of bmlvirmg Covermmmmment ehebt
and providing thme mnommetarv base for a rmmpid ex
1
lalm-
siomm (If credit has the imitiah effect of lmohdimmg iioterest
rates below wimat timev \v-oulld lie in time absemmce of
suchm a pohicy’. Iloivever. time growths of time mimommetary
base determines the gromvtim (If the mmioimev stock, Time
close rciatiolmshmip between acceieratiomms ammd decehera—
tions in time growthm of base ammd mmommmev can he seem
b coniparimmg Cimarts 11 and Ill. Therefore, a policy
omf attemnptimig to resist nmovemimeuts imm mmiarkt’t imiterest
rates-also heads to mm rmspid expansion of the a2mmoummt
of money hahances which isIdividuahs mmmust absorb into
tlmeir wealth portfolhios. From h970 to 1973. time 21707mev
stock grew on time average at about a7percent aummmmah
rate. This is mnore tharf timree tinmes as fast as omver time
1952-62 period of slowly rising prices. As discussed
earlier, time rapid growth of money’ hed to a progres-
sive umpward movenmemmt imi time rate of chiammge of prices
and this led to mm growth in time (leimmamla for credit.
C:,
Monetary Sose
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Today’s higim ievehs of interest rates largely reflect
time acceleratiimg rate of inflatiomm 1mm time Umted States.
Whemm time curremmt rate of immflatiou is taken immto con-
sideration, interest rates are mmot ummnsuahhy “highm.” As
simown in Chart TV, relative to time rate of immflatiou,
adjusted yieidls on Corporate AAA bonds are currently’
lower timmmn aim>’ time witlmin the iast eight years, witim
thie exceptiomm (If early 1971. Aithmough ioug—terimm mmmr-
ket immterest rates hmave been rising shmmrphv since early
1973. time adjumsted yield has heeim falling since’,mhiout
nmid-1973.
Througho time nmiddle of 1974 the Federal funds
rate, the key’ interest rmmte umsed imm short-rumm operating
strategy, has risen simarpiy. However, timere is some
questiomi as to whmethmer time Federal fummds rate Imas
risen because time Federal Reserve 1mi.mshmecl time rate
imp, or in spite of Federal Reserve actions. km times of
rapidl imicremmses in time dlemalmd for credit, it heconmes
aimost inipossible for thme Federal Reserve to imohd imm—
terest rates eonstmmimt. Time mmiore vigoroushy time Federal
Reserve tries to imold interest rates dowmm. time more
rapidly time nmommetary base grows amid, conseqmmemmtiy,
time more rapid the gromvtlm imm time money stock.
An immcreased rate of growtim of time mmmoney stock ap-
pears to have two effects 0mm expectatiomms of fimmammcial
mimarket participammts. First, timey have hearmmed by cx—
periemmce over the last 8-10 years timat a mnaintained
faster growtim of mmmo6mey mimeans a imigimer rate of infla-
tion, and timat meamms hmigbmer immterest rates. Also, finan-
cial mmmrket observers hay-c some idea mmhout thme Fed-
eral Reserve’s desired growth path for time niomsey
stock, \Vhmemm they observe time money stock growing
faster thmami whmat time>’ thiiruk is time Eederai Reserve’s
iimtemmt. tbmemm time>’ expect tlmmtt time Federmmi Reserve
wiH imave to tighmtemm policy’, asic1 lmemmce expect imigimer
interest rates, at lemmst in time nmmmedmate ftmture.
To restrict time growtlm of tIme mmmoney stock in periods
of risimmg demands for credit, time J’ederal Reser\e must
rmmise its target range for time Fcderah funds rate
ahead of time immarket deternmmed hevel. If ilmcreases
ism time target range for time Federal fummds rmmte lag time
niai’ket—determmmimmed rate, then the !mmollev stock wiil
accelerate, eveom timoumgim time Federah fnmmds rate moves
upward quite rapidly.
Central hankers nmust he extremmiely’ wary of state-
ments that, imecause immterest rates are high, nmommey is
tight or monetmmry policy actmomms more restrictive. Such
statememmts exbmibit a fummmdasmmesmtm.mi eommfusion betweemm
money amid credit timmmt cmmim be fmmtal for attempts to
slow inflation. Interest rates are time price of credit,
not the price of money. TIme reasomm tIme price of
credit is imighm is not because mmiommey is tight, hmmt be-
cause it has heemm too easy. Time pre\’ioums rapid growthm
of money bias generated aim expected rise imm demammd
mmmmd rising prices ammd, imence, gs-owismg demmiands for
credit. Commmparimmg Cimart \1 asmd Chmart II, it can be
seen that, enmpirieahiy. it is time case timat iomv imiterest
rates, not hugh interest rates, fohlow mm period of tiglmt
nmoney.
On. O.mimery’Am!
An immmportant pmu-t of time flmmmmimeimmi sector of time
limited Stmmtes is eonmposed of flmmammcial intenmmedimmries
whmmeim horrow shmort-temnm and lend long-ternm. Thmese
institumtsonsare priniarihy engaged in fimmasmeimmg mmmort—
gage credit denmaimcis, mmmmd consist of hmstitumtiomms suds
mts savimmgs mod loan mtssociatiomms, immmmtmmmmi sa\’ismgs banks,
life insumrmmnce companies. mnmd remmi estmmte investmmmemmt
trusts. For these fiomanciai immtermmmediaries it is mmot time
level of time termn sirumeture of ismterest rates timmmt is of
prnmmmmr immmportance, humt vmmriabomms imm time ievei.
Jim mmmi muccelerating inflation, mmmrket ismterest rates 0mm
assets eoimmpetitive untim sam-iligs dcpmmsits are rising, and
savings immstitutioims immust raise time interest rates time>’
pay to horromvshort-term or fact’ an outflow of (heposits.
Under sucim cireuimmstmmuees. the savings mstitutions
come uimder commsiderahie pressure. Time cost of imor—
rowimug slmort—termmm rises rapidiy, immmt time bmmik of thmeir
portfolio of assets is locked ioto nommhqmiid loimg—ternm
nmosrtgages thmat imave mm fixed interest rmmte.
Time smmmoothm operation (If finasmcimmh mimarkets is also
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A potemmtiahly serious situmatiosm c-aim develop if a few
large financial immstitutiomms misread time future path of
interest rates. Suppose a lender expects that interest
rates mviii fmdh in time mmext six nmonths. 1mm late 1973 and
early 1974 several respected financial advisory serv-
ices were forecasting failing ismterest rates. Time hender
will timemm try to borrow slmort-term 1mm order to exteimd
his long-ternm assets. For example, a hank would try
to immcrease its borrowimmgs in time Federal funds mmmarket
and sell short-term large certificates of deposit, while
extemmding longer-term business loans-amid purclmasimmg
longer-tenmm Covernment securities. If, however, simort-
term rates rise very rapidly, instead of failing as pre-
dicted, tlmen om- hypothetical bank will incur losses.
Fronm early Decemmmber 1973 tlmrougim late February
1974 short-term ismterest rates iim the United States fell
whmihe longer-term interest rates continued to rise. From
late Novenmber to hate February, large commercial
banks increased their term business loans by about
$1.3 bilhiomm amid timeir holdings of Covermmment securi-
ties withm over 5 yemmrs to nmaturity imy almout $600 mil-
lion. Over the same period, time volunme of large certi-
flcates of deposit oumtstammdnmg immcremmsed by ahiout $2
billion and time average mmet purchmase of Federal funds
rose by $2.6 billion. In early March, shos’t-ternm immter-
est rates began to increase ammd over time fohiowimig
nuonths rose yes-mt shmarphy’. Time mmmmmiket rate oim 90 (Ia>’
certificates of cieposit rose over 300 basis poirmts from
late February to mid-May, and time rate 0mm Federal
funds rose over 250 basis poismts. Therefore, time cost
to an individual imank of ohmtaimmmsmg short—term fummcis
to flnasmce ternm balms made during late 1973 mmd earl>’
1974 mmmmd to carry’ securities purcimased cbmmriug tlmat
time rose sumbstammtialhy imm time foilowismg three moumthms,
Thus discumssion is not amm mottemmmpt tim picture time
flnmmncimmh systenu mms “ismherenthy unstahmhe.” It is immtemmcbed
to simow thmat attemmmpts liv time mmmommetarv aumthorities to
resist denmammd-determusied opwmurd pressures on ismter—
est rmttes, except in ti a’ very shmort ruin, do soot result
in easing flmmammciah market pressures As time nmormetary’
authmormties expammd time mnosmetarv lmase, mnommey’ expands
amid ultinmateiy thmere’are gremmter uspward pressures omm
interest rates as time denmanch for credit immcreases. Ulti-
mately, such a policy results in greater, not hess,
strain imm time flmmammciah smmarkets, ammd makes time prob-
lems encountered by time central bank wimen it at-
tesmmpts to slow imuflatiomm that nmuchm greater. ‘l’hmis is
CS,,,,
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exanmpie, bond dealers are reluctant to take positions
in long~termsecurities, because with rapidly rising in-
terest rates, there is aim increasimmg risk of capital loss.
Page 19FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS SEPTEMBER 1974
especially tm’ue because sonic flnauciah operators still
mmppear to imehieve timmmt time mmmommetmmry mouthmorities camm
bold rmummrket immterest rmotes hiehow tIme iem’eh deterimmismed
Im>’ fundaommentmd market factors. The only way to even-
tually’ achmieve lower immterest rates is to siow time growth
of nmosmey amid credit. However, timis immmphies’ additional
temporary upward pressures 0mm immterest rates, and
fortimer raises time spector of mmmmothmer credit crumuch”.
Tfmese factors furtimer ilhustrate that, time longer infla-
tiomu is permitted to develop, time more difficult it is
to stop.
tCO.O.OmnOLflC.~7~1d~i..s
It is very difficult to judge the effect of inflation
on time predictive performance of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis model, as weil as asm.y other model.
During most of time period since August 1971 the U.S.
econonuy has been subject to various types of price
controls. Timese cosmtrohs prohahmiy distorted time be-
hmavior of pmices rehative to wimat time>’ would imave
been without controls. Under timese conditions, econo-
metric nuodels are only a guide to the upward pres-
sines that are building on prices.
For exanmple, the St. Louis model overestimated
the reported rise in prices during the period of price
controls, Imut since the lifting of most price controls,
it has underestimated the increases in prices. On bal-
ance, thue mnodeh has fairly accurately projected the
hong-run Imehavior of prices. As shown in Tahhe I, fit-
ring the nuodel thurormgim time secoimd quarter of 1971,
time last fnil quarter before price controls, and project-
immg thmronghm 1973 simows thmat time smmochei estimmmateci
about mm 5 pereesmt growtim of time price deflator frommm
11/71 t]mroughm IV/73. Actual reported prices rose at
a muuucim shower rmmte durimmg time price coimtrol period.
thmemm acceles’mmted mms price cosmtrohs were hifteci.
fl’O:Tflofl..Ot (m,mr,.s.;,J:..W,s:~,~
Time use of real immstead (If muominmmh ciuantities as
guides to monetary policy can he extremely danger-
omms.ms First, all thmat pohcymakers, as wehh as other
economic agemuts, oilserm.’e is nonmimmai interest rates and
7muommev bmahmoimces, Time>’ mmevcr obsery’e real ismterest
rates or real nmouev hahasmces, ammd ecouonuists cannot
agree on Imorm’ to mmccurmutehy mneasure timese real quamm—
titles. Thmis is mmot to say tlmat time rate of inflation does
not emmter ismto time pubmhics decisiomu to hiorrow, nor
:mThis sectimmmm mira’Vs imemmvily on time article by I)elmis S.
Karmmoskv “Real Motmey Balances A Misleadi7mg Indicator of
Monetary Actioims,’~this Renew ( Febnsary 197.4) pp. 2-10,
To I
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then decisiosm as to time amount of money balances
timey desire to hold. However, the crucial distinctioi
for centm-al bankers is that, while individuals adjust
timeir money holdings to prices, for the economy as a
mvhole, prices adjust to the anmount of money. See-
ondhy, the ratio of money to some price index is a
faulty indicator of tightness or ease of monetary policy
because this ratio is determined by the public and
is ultimately beyond the contioh of time monetary an-
thorities. Monetary actions have only a temporary
effect on real nuoney balances.
There are five periods from 1955 to 1973 when time
ratio of money to commnodity prices declined for
two (Jimarters or nmore: 1955-57, 1959-60, 1966, 1969,
and 1973. Prior to 1973, eacim period in which “real
hmalances” dechined for two quarters or more was fol-
iomved imy a sigmmiflcaomt shomvclown imm economic activity,
ramugimug from the 1966-67 mimmi-recessiosu to full-scale
recessions in time othuer periods.
In 1955-57, 1959-60, 1966, and 1969 a large portion
of the decline in real balances reflected a sharp drop
in the rate of growthm of time money stock below its
tremud. Time deceicration in mnommey growtbm imm 1973 was
smot as mmhrupt. Immsteach, time indicmoted dechime imm “remmi
hmmhammces in 1973 reflected, imm large pmurt, time reported
micceieratiomm of inflmotiomm.
Since time adjustment of prices to a change in the
trend rate of money growth is estimated to take fronu
foumr to six y’ears to complete, it is probahhe that tIme
economy is still adjusting to the acceherated rate of
money growtlm over the last three and one-half years.
Supporting evidence for timis contention can be found
in time nuovement emf interest rates in 1973.
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The inflation of last year, instead of threatening to
restrict aggregate demand by eroding real money bal-
ances below desired hevchs, reflects instead the efforts
of time public to dispose of excess money hmdammces. On
time basis of past experience, if time momuey stock coim-
tinned to grow at aim average rate of close to 6.5 per-
cent, such as since early 1970, this mmdjustment would
continue at least thiouglm 1974.
The arguments wimieh contend timat monetary policy
is restrictive, on flue basis of the recent decline in
“real mommey balances,” imply to some aimahysts a rec-
omnmenclation to pohcyinakers to increase time rate of
money growtim above time rate of inflation in order to
restore time growth of real balances. Both theoreticah
analysis and time experience of otiuer couimtries imidicate
that there are few mmmore dangerotms courses of actiosm
timat any monetary authority could ummehertake.
A further increase in time rate of money growth,
above its current trend rate of about 6.5 percent
would only generate pressure for furtimer inflation. It
is not possible to avoid the adjustment of real money
balances to the level desired by thue public by increas-
ing the rate of money growth.
Oime extrenme example of the futihty of a policy of
trying to make money grow fast enough to prevent
desired real bahances from fahhing is given by the Ger-
man experience in the early 1920s. By hate 1923 tax re-
ceipts of time German government were covering hess
than one percent of its expenditures. To finance its
expenditures, time government borrowed from the
Reiehsba.mmk, which simnply tunmed on the printing
presses. The majonty of trained economists in Ger-
many refused to believe in a chain of causation run-
ning from the growth of the money stock to the growth
of prices. Rudolf Havenstein, President of the Reichs-
hank, tended to believe that the rise in prices created
a need for money on the part of businessmen and
the government which was the Reiehsbank’s duty to
meet, and which would have almost no harmful ef-
fects on the econonmy. \Vimemm coimupiaimmts of “short—
ages” of muommey arose, despite time issue of demmonmimma-
tions as large as 100 billion marks, Havenstein seri-
ously expressed hope that new high-speed currency
printing presses soon to be installed would overcome
the shortage.4
tm
The material in this section draws upon Lelarmd B. Yeager,
International Monetary Relations (New York: harper and
Row Publishers, t966 ) pp. 269-72), amid quntes frnimi the
League of Nations Study, The Com,rse arid Control of IiifLa-
(ion. See also. Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices and
Production in Hyper-Inflation: Germany 1920-23 (New York:
Russell amid Russell, 1930).
PJIOPO/1k1 .STO ()FF/ET mI.~/I.,±t’hr.IoJ~%J
Recently, proposals for tying future payments in
contracts to some price index (so-called indexing)
and explicit payment of interest on demand deposits
have been suggested as ways of removing some of
the losses associated with unexpected future price
movements.
in.aexnr.g
The use of indexing has increased in the U.S. econ-
onmy as inflation has accelerated. Recently, the U.S.
Congress decided to tie social security payments to
the consumer price irmdex, amid nmore wage contracts
are being written with cost of living escalator clauses,
not only for wages, but also for pensions.5 However,
these actions represent only partial indexing. At pres-
ent, it does not appear that the U.S. is likely to adopt
a full economy-wide pattern of indexing. Especially
difficult problems would arise when indexing such
items as interest rates. For example, attempts to de-
velop variable interest rate mortgages have met with
less than enthusiastic support.
Partial indexing probably creates more problems
than it solves. Groups wlmose flow of payments are
linked to sonue price index will lie far less willing to
support efforts to halt inflation. This is especially
true because policies taken to slow inflation also in-
volve some simort-run rise in unemploynment. It is one
thing to explain the reason for tighter fiscal and mone-
tar>’ policy to aim individuah by pointing out that in-
creased Government spending financed by money cre-
ation results in a fahi imm his reai inconme; it is nmticim
more diffictmit, however, to convmmmce him of time merits
of tigimter fiscal and monetary policy wimen his inconme
is tied to a price index.
The actual implementation of gemmerahzed index-
ing presents considerable practical difficuhties. Mhat
price index will he chosen? W7lmo will decide the way
to index prices? What about outstanding contracts?
How do you index profits? For example, there has
been considerable furor raised over recent attempts
to broaden time coverage of time eonstmmner pi-ice index.
Also, some aspects of indeximmg would require sub-
stantial elmanges in tax laws, for example, tying the
personal exenmptiomm to inflatiomm and taking the effect
of inflation into account iii eonmputimmg depreciatiomm
iFor ahout 5 milhon workers, eimasmgcs iii their limcomes are
tied to chammges in the coimsuimmer price mmdcx, Receipts of aim
additional 3 mnilhoim food stamp recipients and all social
security recipients are also affected by changes in the CPI.
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mind capital gaimus. Also, mmii state usury laws wouid
imam’e to lie mthohsimed and reguiatiomms on payimment of
interest on time ammd savimmgs deposits woimid hmave to
lie remmmoved or modlified. Time effect of nmammy mm—
dexhmg proposals would lie to hold time Govermmnmemmt’s
tax revemmues constammt mts infimmtiorm immcreased. 1mm infla-
tion time cost of existiimg Governmument opermmtiomms would
rise, aimd if timere was nti cut imm Governmmuent opera-
tions, dheficit financing u’oulcl increase. Tlmese decisions
move us from time field of ecommomic theory into time
area (if pohtmcs and! hitmreaucrac. b-lmnimmg observed
time fiasco (if wmmge and price coimtrols, time author is
mmone too confident timat time Govermmnmeimt can resist
time temptatiomm to selectively intervemme in time dievelop-
memmt of aim indeximmg svstenm, and! heimee is doubtful
timat a viable systenm of indeximmg can lie developed.
Interest Jiqy.~~g~fs. on Dem.anc~.Deposit-s
Generally, time argummmeimts timat Imave been advanced
for proimibitiomm of interest payments on demand de-
posits in time United States are not supported by
empirical evidemmce. Curremmtly, coimmimmercial hanks pmmy
amm implicit rmmte (if interest 0mm demmmancl deposits: time
cost (if servicimmg d!enmammd deposits is greater than serv-
ice charges by banks. Thus prohmmblv leads to sonme
inefficiency imm allocation of resources that could be
avoided if bmmmmks pmmmd mt mnarket-deternmined mtem-est
rate mm demnammd deposits ammd clummrged ciepositors time
full cost of haimk services.
However, as a practical mmmatter. a widespread move-
nmeimt in support of paymemut of immterest on dienuand
deposits does imot appear hikeiy in time near future.
Cimammges in legislation would be required to permit
comnuercial haimks to mmmake explicit interest paymuemuts
0mm demmmmmimd deposits, mmmmd timere (hoes imot appear to
be wide emuougim support for timese chmmmmmges fronm any
wehi-orgammized political group.
co.Nc~LusIoNs
The way to reduce ismflationary pressures imm time
United Stmttes econommmy is to slow time growth of time
muoimey stock. On an mmverage-of-year to mmvermtge—of—
year basis, time money stock grew at about a 7 percent
rate fronm 1970 to 1973. It seenms to be a gemmerahly
accepted propositiomu imm ecommoimmics timmmt time growtlm of
prices’ adijusts to time growtlm of mommey over aim cx-
teimded penod of timmme. Therefore, if time 7 percermt
rmmte of mnoney growtiu expenemmced over time last three
r’ears imm the U.mmited Stmmtes is mauntmuned, timis inuphes
our econonmy- ~viii adjust toward! a ioimg—ruim 6-7 percemmt
rate (if inflation. Time recemmt surge imm prices reflects
partly mum adijustmmment to tIme renmoval of price coimtrols,
and partly time commtimmuec! upward! mmdjustnmemmt to time
mmverage growtim of time mmmoney stock.
Time ommi>’ way to halt the upivard movenment of
immterest rates is to slow mommey growth. If our econonmy
is hemnmg forced to adijust to a 6-7 percemmt annual rate
(if immflatiomu, timeim mmommmimmmml interest rates omm long—term
hommds will imot remmmmmin at aronmud S pereemmt hint proh—
aimie will rise to 9-10 perceimt.
In time United States time cemmtral hank can halt time
growtlm of time money stock. Time Federal Reserve,
tlmrougim its open market operations, camm commtroh time
growth of time nmoimetary hiase, mind hemmee control the
growtim of time money stock, Time Federal Reserve is
on record! as lmas’immg time immtent to slow time growth of
time momuey stock. Time intemmt of policy is mmot to cause
a dramatic imalt to mommey growtlm, hiecause of time
simort-run effects ~in eummploymiment, hitmt to gradually
redluce time trend growtlm of money.
Whetlmer or not timis “imutemmt” is remmhized will crucially
depemmd upomu (1) time Gos’enummment’s wihitmgmuess to
exercise restraint in its spemmding. and (2) a wi!ling—
mmess on time pmtrt of time Federal Reserm-e to allow
market interest rates to rise teimmporanly to luigim levels.
As disctm,ssed earlier, muonmumal immterest rates thmat seem
extremely higim by historical stmnmdards’ are mmot hmighm
wimeim time curremmt rate of imufiatiomu is takemm into account.
It is useful to refer agaimm to time Germamm experience
of 1920—23 to see how excessive govermmnmemmt spendnmg
amid central hiammk ereatiomm of mmmommey becomne hoummd
togetimer, and imow difficult it is for mmmmy cemmtrmml hank
to ptirsue a mommetary policy timat runs cotmmmter to the
govermmnueimts fiscal policy.
This fmumdmummemmtmml cause, insnfmmr as it (hoes mmot rest
0mm tIme hialammee of ~iaynmeimts, is ---time hommmmdless
gm-owtl I of the flomitimmg debt mm mmd its trmmmusf ormum mmtion
iimto time lneamms of paymmment -. .tlmrouglm time discount—
imug of time Reiclm Treasury- bills amid time Reichmshammk.
Here too the Reiehsbank is alleged to be guilty,
beemmuse it has not opposed time Reiclm govermmmnemmt
and fiscal adnministration by refusing to continue time
c!iscoummtimug of Treasury hills. Tlmis reproach is also
ummjustified mimic1 completely’ nmisjudges the actual situ-
ation. The Reichsbank has done all it could do with
am’ chance of success. For years -- -it imas continim-
mmliv cailed attemmtiomm to these Coimdi t Omms mmii dl dciiianded
a remedy in the most serious and urgent way, but
it was imot imm a positiomu to stop time disconntimmg of
Treasury hulls as lommg as time Reich had no other
available means to cover its deficit, amid as long as
all groups iii the legislature were imot fully eon-
vi’mc’ed tiumit s mmcl m immeamms ahsolimti‘lv Tm mmve to lie foumid,
F’or the Reich nuimst me, ammti real remummmciation of
discounting in the face of time tasks set by time budget
odd have led to chaos, The threat (if mm general
refusal to discomunt Treasury bills would Imave been
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nothing but a futile gesture. Only “cry recently, un-
der pressure of dire necessity, have all groups in the
hegislatnre been convinced - --that fiscal policy ab-
solutely must be based upon adequate sources of
income.6
ORudolf Havensteimu, “Defending the Policy of the Reichshammk”
Address to the Executive Commmmmmittee of the Reiclmsbank,
August 25, 1923) in Fritz K. Ringer, The German Inflation
of 1923 (New Yom’k, Oxford University Press, 1969), pp.
93-96.
Author’s Note
Somehow time ptmhlie must he commvinced thmat once
immflation imas gaimmec! a flnmm footimohd there is no paimm—
less way to Imalt it. Also. tlme public must realize timat
goods provided hiy time governmmmemut are mmot free goods.
If thme governmermt sector mmhsorhs amid rec!istrihutes a
harger segnmemmt of real output, thmemm time private sector
rmmtmst he satisfied witim a smnmmhler simare. Ummiess timese
fummdamnemmta! facts are ummderstood, timen time good
“immtent” of policy will probably mmot be realized.
Since this paper was prepared in May 1974, there
has been a revision of money stock data for the first
ha/f of 1974. The revised data suggest that monetary
actions in the United States have been directed at
reducing inflation wit/i a minimum impact on em-
ployment. For example, on a quarterly-average basis,
from second quarter 1973 to second quarter 1974, the
money stock grew about 6 percent. This represents
a moderate reduction in the average growth of 7
percent recorded from first quarter 1970 to second
quarter 1973. It also represents a move away from
the pattern of accelerating money growth experienced
over the period since early 1970.’
Since May, however, inflation has continued to ac-
celerate at an alarming rate, and interest rates have
continued to rise. For example, from December 1973
to July 1974, consumer prices rose at about a 12 per-
cent rate, and most forecasters see little reduction in
the rate of inflation through the remainder of 1974.
Yields on corporate bonds are up about 70 basis points
over their May levels, mortgage rates have risen, the
prime commercial hank loan rate is up 50 basis points
from the end of May, and commercial paper rates and
Treasury bill rates are up over 100 basis points.
While prices and interest rates have continued up-
ward, real output has declined. Over the first two
quarters of 1974, GNP in constant dollars decreased
at a 4 percent annual rate. This continues the slowing
in real output growth that began in early 1973. For
example, from the first to the fourth quarter of 1973,
mEmoir, 1/70 to 1/72 immommey grew at ml 6.3 percent rate, tlmcn
fronm 1/72 to 11/73 immommey grew at an 8.1 percent rate.
real output grew at about a 2 percent rate, compared
to a growth rate of 6.7 percent from fourth quarter
1970 to first quarter 1973.
In the author’s opinion the recent sharp accelera-
tion in inflation and the slower growth of real out-
put must he viewed in the long-run context of the
whole period sinve late 1970 when the most recent
expansion began. On balance, since the fourth quarter
of 1970, the general price index has risen at a 5.7 per-
cent annual rate, about in line with what would be
expected from a 6.5-7.0 percent average gromcth rate
of money. Real output has risen at about a 4 pcrcent
average rate, about in line with the longer-run growth
of the productive capacity of the economy. By looking
only at the performance of the economy in the last
one and one-half years, one gets a distorted view of
the performance of prices and output. Over the period
prior to early 1973, real output grew at a rate far in
excess of its long-run potential growth, and prices
were artificially held down by wage and price con-
trols. The recent sharp surge in prices reflects the
ad/ustment to the trend growth of money, following
rela.valion of wage and price controls, and special
situations’ in some domestic and foreign markets.
These adjustments may well continue through 1974.
The recent performance of the economy has led
some people to suggest that fiscal and monetary pol-
icy he directed at stimulating economic activity. Such
a policy response might well frustrate th.e intent of
sloicing inflation without substantially affecting the
rate of grotcth of employment. The criterion of pa-
tience must he added to the other criteria for success-
ful achievement of an intent to slow inflation.
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